Introduction
In 2003, I reported to Basic Combat Training. I knew as soon as the bus pulled onto the post late in the evening that the next ten weeks of my life would like very different from anything I had experienced before. When the bus pulled up to the reception building, a forbidding looking Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) boarded and began barking instructions at the group of nervous young men. Most of us were barely out of high school. As we stumbled off the bus and into the reception building, we were surrounded by posters of soldiers engaging in various challenging physical activities. Each poster was accompanied by a letter which, when all the posters were viewed together, spelled out the acronym “LDRSHIP.” Loyalty. Duty. Respect. Selfless Service. Honor. Integrity. Personal Courage. These Army values would be drilled into each of us over the next ten weeks as the Army sought to instill in a group of raw recruits a shared and consistent idea about the values needed to be a soldier in the United States Army.
By the time we reached the end of the crucible of Basic Training and our final training exercise, we stood in formation in front of our drill sergeants while AC/DC’s “Hell’s Bells” blared from loudspeakers. The drill sergeants walked down the line of new soldiers and handed each of us a small pendant to hang on our identification tags. It was a tag that had the Army values stamped on it. Symbolically, this ceremony meant that we had completed Basic Combat Training and now, in the eyes of the Army, had the Army values ingrained into us. We were not civilians anymore. We were not recruits anymore. We were soldiers. The expectation was that we would leave Basic Training ready to live out the Army values as soldiers, whether in or out of uniform.
Unfortunately, ten weeks of Basic Combat Training is insufficient for inculcating the kind of values the Army wants to see in its soldiers. This paper will illustrate the need for ongoing character development training in soldiers using a modified system of virtue ethics based on the Army values that nests with current Army doctrine and training soldiers already receive. This paper will argue the United States Army must provide, through unit Chaplains in their roles as ethical advisors and trainers, sustained, consistent, and realistic training on virtue ethics to all soldiers in order to instill those values into soldiers throughout their careers.[1]
The Need for Virtue Ethics in The Military
In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that virtue is a mean determined by the rational thought of a prudent man.[2] Contemporary history illustrates the importance of training soldiers in an ethical system that develops internal regulation, like Aristotle’s virtue ethics, versus one that focuses on external compliance.[3] The Army must strike a balance between “discipline and respect for the chain of command, while maintaining moral competence at the same time.”[4] In recent history, there have been well-publicized moral failures that attest to the need for the systematic training of soldiers in virtue ethics. The horrific abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib during the Iraq war by an Army Reserve unit[5] illustrates that even with external rules in place governing the treatment of detainees, soldiers on the ground are fully capable of ignoring those rules and acting with impunity while the fog of war (temporarily) hides their actions from the public eye.[6]
While lower-ranking soldiers largely perpetrated the abuses at Abu Ghraib, advanced rank and education do not automatically confer superior virtue. David Petraeus was one of the most respected military leaders of the Global War on Terror. His downfall came with the revelation that he was having an affair while director of the Central Intelligence Agency. In the military, adultery is a crime punishable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and, in the CIA, it opens the door to potential blackmail. Either way, it is recognized as a moral failure.[7]
A 2015 study by Leonard Wong and Stephen J. Gerras further illustrates the need for training in virtue ethics at all echelons of command. Their study brought to the public eye what those in the military community knew all along: lying on readiness reports, among other things, was rampant. Indeed, the number of requirements placed on commanders to meet the readiness standards of the Army was so onerous that not enough training hours in the year were available to meet training demands placed on the force. This led to commanders at all levels inflating their numbers in order to appear fully compliant.[8] Wong and Gerras revealed that leaders at all levels had failed to adhere to the Army’s ethical standards. Lower-level leaders repeatedly violated Army standards through dishonest reporting, while leaders at higher levels continued to heap requirements onto lower-level leaders without fully appreciating the consequences of their actions. The expectation was compliance. The result was deception.[9] The public fallout was that a values-based institution endured a black-eye due to the inability of Army leaders to take a virtue-based stand against the deontological tendencies of the Army.[10]
Another example from the United States Navy came when Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer refused to carry out an order from President Donald Trump (by tweet) to prevent Navy SEAL Chief Petty Officer Edward Gallagher from being stripped by the Navy of his SEAL Trident.[11] Gallagher had been accused of war crimes including “stabbing a defenseless teenage captive to death, shooting a school-age girl and an old man from a sniper’s roost, and indiscriminately spraying neighborhoods with rockets and machine-gun fire.”[12] Ultimately, Spencer was removed from his position. However, the conflict between him, the President of the United States, and the expectation that military leaders will obey orders illustrates the importance of personal virtue in a setting where deontology often reigns supreme. Spencer assessed that if the Navy did not strip CPO Gallagher of his Trident that irreparable harm would occur to the reputation of the SEALs and the values/virtues the Navy claims to uphold. Thus, he felt the moral choice was to avoid immediately carrying out the order of the President.
He was not unnecessarily disobedient in the full sense. His search for a solution that would protect the integrity of the military organization for which he was responsible — a solution that would probably not have materialized as the result of an instant resignation — was not only an act of moral courage but also an example of a type of obedience in a broader sense required at times by those in the military profession.[13]
These examples, along with many others available in military history, show that members of the military need more than rule-based or outcome-based ethical systems. They need the fortitude of character that can only come through the personal practice of virtue.
Virtue Ethics and The Army Profession (ADP 6–22)
While Army doctrine does not explicitly cite Aristotle, his system of virtue ethics influenced the development of Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6–22, Army Leadership and The Profession. ADP 6–22 defines the Army ethic as “the set of enduring moral principles, values, beliefs, and laws that guide the Army profession and create the culture of trust essential to Army professionals in the conduct of missions, performance of duty, and all aspects of life.”[14] At the heart of the Army ethic is the idea that all members of the United States Army share and live out the Army values. ADP 6–22 provides an organizational definition for each of the Army values.
Later in ADP 6–22, the publication states, “Ethical choices may not always be obvious decisions between right and wrong. Leaders use multiple perspectives to think about ethical concerns, applying them to determine the most ethical choice. One perspective comes from a view that desirable virtues such as courage, justice, and benevolence define ethical outcomes.”[15] This is the most transparent argument for the use of virtue ethics in Army doctrine. It also must be mentioned that virtue ethics is not the only ethical system enshrined in Army doctrine. ADP 6–22 contends that leaders should utilize a blend of three ethical systems as they make decisions: virtue, deontological, and utilitarian. The publication cites the United States Constitution as an example of an agreed-upon set of rules/laws that provide the framework for deontological ethical reasoning.[16] It defines utilitarian ethics as making a “decision on whatever produces the greatest good for the greatest number.”[17] Beyond these basic definitions, ADP 6–22 provides very little insight into these ethical systems, their philosophical roots, or the advantages and disadvantages of the systems. Instead, it encourages leaders, when time is available, to consult with their peers, senior leaders, or Chaplains. While this pragmatic approach to ethical systems proves useful in military operations, virtue ethics requires a more in-depth approach to ensure that soldiers possess the maturity of character necessary to conduct themselves honorably in their daily lives and on the battlefield.
Basic Combat Training: Laying the Foundation for Virtue Ethics
Aristotle argues that we learn moral virtues through the imitation of those who possess and exemplify the virtues.[18] For soldiers faced with the complexities of working within a hierarchical system and navigating the moral fog of the modern battlefield, practical examples of some of the moral virtues are readily available. During Basic Combat Training, new trainees visit various ranges and training areas. At the entrance to these training areas are signs that provide the name of the training area as well as the story behind the name. Typically, the names come from a soldier who performed some sort of valorous action. Often, a trainee reads the account of the valorous action on the sign before the training starts. In Basic Combat Training, the Army wants trainees, just a few days or weeks removed from being civilians, to know what right looks like. Thus, trainees are surrounded by stories of soldiers who lived out the Army values on the field of battle. The stories are inspiring, but there is an inherent weakness to this approach. The Army touts, “This is what loyalty looks like,” but, unfortunately, cannot show how that loyal individual cultivated and developed that internal virtue.[19] Memorizing the Army values and learning inspiring examples might provide soldiers with the intellectual knowledge to recall them on command, but there is more to living out the virtues than military drill and accounts of battlefield heroics.[20]
While the approach used in Basic Combat Training is suitable for trainees, more advanced training on virtue ethics for soldiers throughout their careers is necessary. As evidenced by the award citations of Medal of Honor recipients, warfare places extreme demands upon our soldiers, and the ethical system of the Army must be up to the task of providing a strong moral compass in sometimes horrific situations. The ethical minimum is insufficient.[21]Aristotle’s system of virtue ethics allows Army ethics trainers to provide a more robust ethical framework for soldiers while still using language and ideas familiar to every soldier. Building off the Army values, leaders at every level of the Army can leverage virtue ethics to inform their own decision making.
Virtue Ethics and The Army Values
With the Army values already built into the culture of the Army, they provide a starting point for exploring virtue ethics more deeply. Rather than seeing them as a list of rules or duties soldiers must follow, the Army should see them as virtues to be practiced and cultivated both in and out of uniform. This change makes the Army values less a system imposed by an external organization that requires, at least, surface-level compliance and makes it an internally focused way of developing individual character. An educated moral agent “does what is virtuous because it is virtuous.”[22] The investment in individual character development then affects the entire organization as individuals incorporate the practice of the virtues more fully into their lives.
For this to succeed, the Army must train the Army values more like Aristotle teaches his virtues: as a mean between two extremes. Aristotle provides twelve spheres of action or feeling. For example, in the sphere of fear and confidence, the mean is courage, while the excess is rashness, and the deficiency is cowardice. A similar pattern provides leaders the opportunity to explore facets of the Army values that goes beyond the basic definitions provided in ADP 6–22.
Teaching the Army values as virtues provides for more nuance than is possible with the deontological approach to the values as advocated by ADP 6–22. It permits trainers to focus not just on the values themselves and the duty of soldiers to live by them, but also what it means to live in the mean between the extremes and to develop those characteristics internally. It requires soldiers to think critically about more than just the definitions and to consider the potential extremes in their own lives. The Army profession often puts soldiers in extraordinary circumstances where the pull toward excess or deficiency is incredibly strong. Aristotle believes that it is through the “repeated performance of just and temperate acts that we acquire virtues.”[23] Training soldiers to practice the mean through providing practical examples of virtuous living from history provides a starting point for soldiers to begin to cultivate the virtues in their lives by modeling them on the lives of their forebears.
A practical benefit to virtue ethics training based on the Army values is that it creates a shared ethical framework from which the unit operates.[24] The Army cannot depend on soldiers entering the Army having similar sets of values. Where most soldiers of previous generations would have shared an ethic at least broadly informed by Judeo-Christian ideas, today’s soldiers often lack any grounding in a formal ethical system informed by religion or philosophy. Thus, it is critical for the continuation of the Army as a values/virtues based profession to create that shared ethical understanding from the newest Private to most seasoned General Officer. Even foundational Army doctrine depends upon virtuous soldiers.
Virtue Ethics and Mission Command
Aristotle’s system of virtue ethics aligns with the Army’s doctrine of command and control known as mission command. ADP 6–0 states that mission command “empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation.”[25] This leadership philosophy empowers leaders at the lowest possible level. It also gives soldiers on the ground during an operation a great deal of freedom in making decisions that best fit the situation at hand. While this eliminates a great deal of red tape, it also carries grave risk if the soldiers executing the orders of their higher headquarters do not conduct themselves in a virtuous manner.[26] The Army believes that war is inherently chaotic and uncertain. Thus, the individual needs the freedom to act quickly, decisively and, often, independently. This makes the character formation of individual soldiers critical to the success of the Army and critical to the doctrine of mission command. Army leaders must be able to trust that their subordinates will conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the Army ethic if the principles of mission command are to be effective.[27]
The principles of mission command help “commanders to capitalize on the subordinate ingenuity, innovation, and decision making to achieve the commander’s intent when conditions change or current orders are no longer relevant.”[28] This bottom-up approach to military operations means that commanders are relying on individual soldiers to possess the character necessary to conduct themselves honorably during the crucible of combat.[29]Challenging circumstances tend to amplify the best and worst aspects of character. Thus, a systematic approach to character development in soldiers must be employed if commanders are to fully implement the principles of mission command on the modern battlefield. There is a serious risk in employing soldiers on the battlefield lacking in character and simultaneously lacking in guidance and supervision from their higher headquarters. The warrior doing violence on behalf of the people of the United States of America must act in a moral and virtuous manner that is consistent with the laws of war and the Army values/virtues.[30] The question, then, is how does the Army institute this training across the force?
The Role of the Chaplain in Training the Army Values/Virtues
The United States Army already has the personnel and the regulations in place to enable and empower the teaching of ethics in units. In order for this training to offer something unique from the ethics training offered by Staff Judge Advocates,[31] Chaplains must engage their units in ethics training to help develop the character of personnel in their units. This is in line with the guidance provided to Chaplains in Army Training Publication 1–05.04, Religious Support and Internal Advisement. The publication states that Chaplains “advise commands on matters of religion, morals, morale and ethics in relation to potential impact on command decisions, unit operations, and the soldiers, Families and authorized Civilians within units.”[32] The publication further provides specific justification for Chaplains to lead training in virtue ethics by defining the approach as one of the three the Army officially recognizes.[33] Regarding virtue ethics, it says that “The virtue perspective looks toward desirable character traits of the individual to understand what is ethical in the form of desirable virtues such as courage, justice, and benevolence.”[34] Chaplains are not asked to perform this duty as ethical advisors and trainers; they are required to perform this duty.
Chaplains have a unique opportunity in their role as advisors and trainers on ethical issues to show the critical component of becoming a moral person and engaging in ethical behavior is character development. While the Army might be more concerned with external compliance, the Chaplain is the one person in a unit who looks deeper than surface obedience to explore whysoldiers should do right. The focus of the Chaplain is less on, “Is it legal or illegal?” and more on, “Is it right or wrong, and how can I help develop in soldiers the internal compass to aid them in making those decisions.” Chaplains do not have the luxury of abdicating this responsibility to another entity in the Army. The Chaplain works closest with the soldiers and unit leadership daily and, because of that proximity and those relationships, stands best able to speak truth into the day to day lives of the unit’s personnel and operations.
Thus, Chaplains need to become subject matter experts on ethics as no other individual in the formation has the same mandate to advise the command and train soldiers on character development through ethics training. Few Chaplains will have the opportunity to be professionally trained in ethics,[35] but the requirement remains. The implied task for individual Chaplains is to personally engage in professional development by reading books and taking classes that will expand their knowledge of ethics and philosophy. Then, engage with Chaplains who are trained ethicists for mentoring and the development of training materials, and engage with their unit leadership to ensure that opportunities to train soldiers on ethics are a part of the long-range planning for the organization.
Conclusion
The complexities of the modern battlefield, Army doctrine, and the Army’s mission command philosophy require individual soldiers be people of the highest character. Not every person who enters the Army has had the luxury of a life that lends itself toward the virtues the Army demands of its soldiers. Additionally, it is easy for soldiers to lean heavily on the deontological and utilitarian ethical systems that fit readily with the models of decision-making and the Army espouses. However, to have genuinely moral soldiers, the Army must invest in character development training. It can do that by leveraging the resources already available: unit Chaplains training soldiers on virtue ethics using the Army values and Army doctrine as a starting point. By starting early and continuing throughout the career of the soldier, the result is not just better soldiers but also better people. As General George C. Marshall said in a speech to Trinity College in 1941:
The soldier’s heart, the soldier’s spirit, the soldier’s soul, are everything. Unless the soldier’s soul sustains him he cannot be relied on and will fail himself and his commander and his country in the end…
It is true that war is fought with physical weapons of flame and steel but it is not the mere possession of these weapons, or the use of them, that wins the struggle. They are indispensable but in the final analysis it is the human spirit that achieves the ultimate decision.[36]
Bibliography and Endnotes
Apostolova, Iva. “Women and War: A ‘different’ Experience? Should Women Be Allowed to Take up the Position of Combat soldiers?” Science et Esprit 66, no. 1 (January 2014): 49–58.
Aristotle, and Jonathan Barnes. The Nicomachean Ethics. Edited by Hugh Tredennick. Translated by J. A. K. Thomson. 1 edition. London, Eng. ; New York, N.Y: Penguin Classics, 2004.
Baarle, Eva van, Jolanda Bosch, Guy Widdershoven, Desiree Verweij, and Bert Molewijk. “Moral Dilemmas in a Military Context. A Case Study of a Train the Trainer Course on Military Ethics.” Journal of Moral Education 44, no. 4 (December 2015): 457.
Beard, Matthew. “Virtuous soldiers: A Role for the Liberal Arts?” Journal of Military Ethics 13, no. 3 (October 2014): 274.
Calhoun, Laurie. “How Violence Breeds Violence: Some Utilitarian Considerations.” Politics 22, no. 2 (May 2002): 95.
— — — . “The Injustice of ‘Just Wars.’” Peace Review 12, no. 3 (September 2000): 449.
Gaston, K Healan. “‘A Bad Kind of Magic’: The Niebuhr Brothers on ‘utilitarian Christianity’ and the Defense of Democracy.” Harvard Theological Review 107, no. 1 (January 2014): 1–30.
Immel, August R. “The Need for an Ethical Fitness Assessment in the US Armed Forces.” Journal of Military Ethics 15, no. 1 (April 2016): 3–17.
Jensen, Mark N. “Hard Moral Choices in the Military.” Journal of Military Ethics 12, no. 4 (December 2013): 341–356.
Kakutani, Michiko. “How Abu Ghraib Became the Anything-Goes Prison.” The New York Times, May 14, 2008, sec. Books. Accessed March 16, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/14/books/14kaku.html.
MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, Third Edition. 3rd edition. Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007.
Moelker, René, and Peter Olsthoorn. “Virtue Ethics and Military Ethics.” Journal of Military Ethics 6, no. 4 (November 2007): 257.
Olsthoorn, Peter. “Intentions and Consequences in Military Ethics.” Journal of Military Ethics 10, no. 2 (June 2011): 81.
Philipps, Dave. “Navy SEALs Were Warned Against Reporting Their Chief for War Crimes.” The New York Times, April 23, 2019, sec. U.S. Accessed March 17, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/23/us/navy-seals-crimes-of-war.html.
Reeve, Elspeth. “What We Know About the Petraeus Affair.” The Atlantic. Last modified November 12, 2012. Accessed March 16, 2020. https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/11/what-we-know-about-petraeus-affair/321538/.
Schulzke, Marcus. “Ethically Insoluble Dilemmas in War.” Journal of Military Ethics 12, no. 2 (July 2013): 95.
— — — . “Rethinking Military Virtue Ethics in an Age of Unmanned Weapons.” Journal of Military Ethics 15, no. 3 (October 2016): 187.
Shaw, Jonathan E. “Moral Warriors: A Contradiction in Terms?” Concordia Theological Quarterly 82, no. 3–4 (July 2018): 247–280.
Whitman, Jeffrey P. “Just War Theory and the War on Terrorism.” Public Integrity 9, no. 1 (Winter2006/2007 2006): 23.
Wong, Leonard, and Stephen J. Gerras. LYING TO OURSELVES: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2015. JSTOR. Accessed March 16, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11350.
Zelcer, Mark. “Ethics for the Weekends: The Case of Reservists.” Journal of Military Ethics 11, no. 4 (December 2012): 333.
“2–484 Speech at Trinity College, June 15, 1941 — Library.” Accessed March 19, 2020. https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/speech-at-trinity-college/.
“ARN2911_ATP 1–05x04 FINAL WEB 1.Pdf,” n.d. Accessed March 19, 2020. https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN2911_ATP%201-05x04%20FINAL%20WEB%201.pdf.
“ARN11484_ATP 1–05x01 FINAL WEB Cropped.Pdf,” n.d. Accessed February 6, 2020. https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN11484_ATP%201-05x01%20FINAL%20WEB%20cropped.pdf.
“ARN14613_FM 1–05 FINAL WEB.Pdf,” n.d. Accessed February 6, 2020. https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN14613_FM%201-05%20FINAL%20WEB.pdf.
“ARN20039_ADP 6–22 C1 FINAL WEB.Pdf,” n.d. Accessed February 6, 2020. https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN20039_ADP%206-22%20C1%20FINAL%20WEB.pdf.
“(Mission Command) ARN19189_ADP_6–0_FINAL_WEB_v2.Pdf,” n.d.
“Was the Former Secretary of the Navy Really Insubordinate?” U.S. Naval Institute. Last modified March 17, 2020. Accessed March 17, 2020. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/march/was-former-secretary-navy-really-insubordinate.
[1] The most consistent training that soldiers receive on the Army Values is during Basic Combat Training. Once soldiers reach their units after Initial Entry Training, the focus of the Army’s mandatory training shifts from a goal of instilling and reinforcing virtue to ensuring that soldiers do not break the law (deontological).
[2] Aristotle and Jonathan Barnes, The Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Hugh Tredennick, trans. J. A. K. Thomson, 1 edition. (London, Eng. ; New York, N.Y: Penguin Classics, 2004), 42.
[3] Deontological ethics is a critical part of the Army’s ethical system. One of the Army values is duty, which ADP 6–22 defines as “Fulfill your obligations.” While this is fine when there is a foundation of virtue ethics, if duty becomes the overriding principle, it can also open up individuals or an organization to potential abuse as they put following orders above all other ethical principles.
[4] Eva van Baarle et al., “Moral Dilemmas in a Military Context. A Case Study of a Train the Trainer Course on Military Ethics,” Journal of Moral Education 44, no. 4 (December 2015): 459.
[5] Mark Zelcer, “Ethics for the Weekends: The Case of Reservists,” Journal of Military Ethics 11, no. 4 (December 2012): 345.
[6] Michiko Kakutani, “How Abu Ghraib Became the Anything-Goes Prison,” The New York Times, May 14, 2008, sec. Books, accessed March 16, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/14/books/14kaku.html.
[7] Elspeth Reeve, “What We Know About the Petraeus Affair,” The Atlantic, last modified November 12, 2012, accessed March 16, 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/11/what-we-know-about-petraeus-affair/321538/.
[8] Leonard Wong and Stephen J. Gerras, LYING TO OURSELVES: (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2015), JSTOR, accessed March 16, 2020, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11350.
[9] In my personal experience, following the publication of the cited article, my commander held an Officer Professional Development session, where all the officers gathered to discuss the article. While there was fruitful discussion and certainly an acknowledgment of the problem, there was little that could practically be done at our level. The reporting and training demands originated at echelons much higher than our own, and thus the solution was to carry on mostly as before while waiting for Pentagon leadership to begin to roll back requirements, which, thankfully, they began to do a few years later.
[10] The idea here is that in the Army if an order is not illegal or immoral, there is a duty to comply. This serves the institution well for the most part. However, it can also become an excuse to comply with unrealistic orders, as was the case in the cited journal article, or even immoral in extreme circumstances.
[11] “Was the Former Secretary of the Navy Really Insubordinate?,” U.S. Naval Institute, last modified March 17, 2020, accessed March 17, 2020, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/march/was-former-secretary-navy-really-insubordinate.
[12] Dave Philipps, “Navy SEALs Were Warned Against Reporting Their Chief for War Crimes,” The New York Times, April 23, 2019, sec. U.S., accessed March 17, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/23/us/navy-seals-crimes-of-war.html.
[13] “Was the Former Secretary of the Navy Really Insubordinate?”
[14] “ARN20039_ADP 6–22 C1 FINAL WEB.Pdf,” n.d., accessed February 6, 2020, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN20039_ADP%206-22%20C1%20FINAL%20WEB.pdf, 1–7.
[15] Ibid, 2–7.
[16] ADP 6–22 aligns the Army Values with deontological ethics as a system of rules by which soldiers should govern themselves. I disagree with this and believe that the Army values more closely align with virtue ethics and should be taught in the Army as such. This paper assumes the alignment of the Army values with virtue ethics.
[17] Ibid, 2–7.
[18] John M. Frame, A History of Western Philosophy and Theology (P & R Publishing, 2015), 75.
[19] Matthew Beard, “Virtuous soldiers: A Role for the Liberal Arts?,” Journal of Military Ethics 13, no. 3 (October 2014): 277.
[20] Baarle et al., “Moral Dilemmas in a Military Context. A Case Study of a Train the Trainer Course on Military Ethics.”, 462.
[21] René Moelker and Peter Olsthoorn, “Virtue Ethics and Military Ethics,” Journal of Military Ethics 6, no. 4 (November 2007): 257.
[22] Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, Third Edition, 3rd edition. (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 149.
[23] Aristotle and Barnes, The Nicomachean Ethics, 38.
[24] In this case, I envision “unit” as being battalion-sized elements and smaller. Programs of ethical instruction are not without precedent at higher levels, but their ability to impact the most junior soldiers will be limited. Battalion, company, and platoon level training allows trainers to create a shared ethical framework and language that soldiers, NCOs, and Officers all share.
[25] “(Mission Command) ARN19189_ADP_6–0_FINAL_WEB_v2.Pdf,” 1–3.
[26] Marcus Schulzke, “Rethinking Military Virtue Ethics in an Age of Unmanned Weapons,” Journal of Military Ethics 15, no. 3 (October 2016): 187.
[27] The principles of mission command, according to ADP 6–0, are competence, mutual trust, shared understanding, commander’s intent, mission orders, disciplined initiative, and risk acceptance.
[28] “(Mission Command) ARN19189_ADP_6–0_FINAL_WEB_v2.Pdfm,” 1–4.
[29] A detailed treatment of moral failure in recent combat actions can be found in the book Black Hearts by Jim Frederick. This book tells of a platoon that committed one of the most horrific war crimes of the Global War on Terror when they raped an Iraqi girl and subsequently executed her and her family. This book and the story it tells are regularly referenced during Army ethics training events.
[30] Jonathan E Shaw, “Moral Warriors: A Contradiction in Terms?,” Concordia Theological Quarterly 82, no. 3–4 (July 2018): 247–280.
[31] This training focuses on deontology. It is about following the rules and keeping leaders and soldiers out of trouble.
[32] “ARN2911_ATP 1–05x04 FINAL WEB 1.Pdf,” n.d., accessed February 6, 2020, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN2911_ATP%201-05x04%20FINAL%20WEB%201.pdf, iii.
[33] The other two being deontological and utilitarian. The publication advocates for an approach that blends the three ethical systems depending on the needs of the situation.
[34] Ibid, 2–10.
[35] Every year, the Army selects a handful of Chaplains to earn an additional Master’s Degree in ethics or bioethics. That Chaplain is then utilized for three years in a position where they will teach and advise on ethics.
[36] “2–484 Speech at Trinity College, June 15, 1941 — Library,” accessed March 19, 2020, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/speech-at-trinity-college/.